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across north africa beginning with egypt, i've asked our speakers to limit the remarks to roughly seven minutes in order to reserve plenty of time for your questions and answers. dr. anthony and the organizers as always have provided with a series of thought-provoking questions, and as with previous panels, question cards we available to you. so first, i'd like to call on karim who is a visiting professor, and served as a great egyptian diplomat with direct experience in egypt's diplomacy towards middle east regional security, arms control and nonproliferation issues. is also a veteran of the egyptian information and political military affairs office here in washington. so it offers a unique insight into the delicate relationship new leaders find themselves maneuvering in. mr. haggag, thank you. >> thank you, and i'd like to thank the council for this opportunity. it's a pleasure to be here with you today. i'd like to focus my remarks on foreign policy, particularly the challenges facing the new egyptian government in the foreign policy and region security realm, but i can set the conce
, tunisia and egypt. the u.s. institute of peace post this to our discussion. >> good morning, everyone. i am steven heydemann, middle east initiative at the u.s. institute of peace and we are delighted to see you all here at today's session on security sector reform in the arab world. i think some of those who rsvp may have been scared away by the false rumor that you would be subjected to a political polling experience following the panel. that's not the case that you don't need to worry about that. were very pleased to have you out here with this morning. i would like to stress that our topic this morning i think is both particularly important, but also especially urgent. i don't think that it is an exaggeration to say that what happens with the security sectors in the arab world over the coming year or so, and by security service, i mean the police, the armed forces and most of all of course the very substantial intelligence apparatus is that exist in every arab country, that what happens with those sectors of the bureaucracy in the arab world will let her sleep determined the fate of
in egypt and tunisia to push this forward and to overcome the increasing polarization. >> i will add to and dan's remarks and say in terms of technicalities and specific steps that need to be taken to reconfigure the domestic security establishment, they are all laid out there in a study that was put together by a group of civil society leaders as well as a group of meetings from the securities sector, commonly known as police for egypt. there's a great deal of debate within civil society about the exact concrete actionable step that needs to be taken in the short run and in the long run some of these steps when themselves to the type of changes that would require the liberation. this is one issue to keep in mind. the dialog's ideas are out there but what is missing as dan mentioned is the political will, the seriousness to engage in dialogue on this issue, even if they're not ready to adopt policy recommendations, there needs to be some kind of ongoing dialogue on these issues but at the same time i want to point out the issue of political will is important, there will always be a c
. >>> next, a discussion on the state of security forces in egypt, tunisia in libya. also the arab spurring countries are in a political transition with the army, police and intelligence services playing different roles in each country. hosted by the u.s. institute of peace, this is two hours. good morning everyone. i am steve heydemann for the middle east initiatives of the u.s. institute of peace, and we are delighted to see you all here today at the session on security sector reform in the arab world. i think some of those that rsvped may have been scared off by the false rumors that he would be colin following the panel. that is not the case. so you don't need to worry about that. we are very pleased to have you all here with us this morning. i would like to stress that our topic this morning i think is both particularly important, but also especially urgent. i don't think that it is an exaggeration to say that what happens with the securities sector within the arab world or over the coming year or so come and buy securities sectors i mean the police, the armed forces, and most of all t
. they are interesting. see the list of countries that it was really at it in. iran, syria, lebanon, saudi arabia, egypt. sometimes it is called viper. a little bit confusing because they often times see things get kind of melted into each other. like you know, a very interesting whole incident. the size and sophistication of this was so great that i think the conclusion is clear that it was a government that was doing this. it is just unfathomable that it could then a smaller kind of scale operation. i think one of my colleagues is going to talk about estonia a little bit more, too. in 2007, estonia removed a statue, a soviet era statute and it caused turmoil between estonia and russia and lo and behold if it didn't become a lot of cyberattacks on mr. linea shutting down their telephone networks commissioning down their banking systems, websites and so on. government services and so on. it was never proven of his russia doing it, but the conclusion is that the very least of his russian hackers. in the end, nato, who is very active in helping estonia understand this, nato step dad and ultimately there's
will not willfully step aside as we saw in tunisia, egypt and even in yemen. and i would argue probably is not amenable to any sort of negotiated solution. the second constant is that the opposition has been perpetually divided, fragmented, unable to coalesce around a unifying vision of a post-assad syria. we've seen divisions among the external opposition, we've seen divisions inside syria, we've seen divisions among the arms groups, divisions based on ideology, divisions based on patrons and so forth. and the third factor is that the international community has remained at a stalemate, has been unable to reach a consensus on how to move forward in syria. we've seen three security council vetoes by russia and china causing many to call the u.n., essentially, ineffective in this crisis. so it's been the interplay of these three factors, i would argue, that has led syria down the path that it has taken. in terms of u.s. policy, u.s. policy is based on the objective of having assad, as president obama called for, step aside. this was back in august of 2011. the problem with u.s. policy is
interest for america first? if you take a look at egypt, under the original plan, we gave tremendous amounts of foreign aid to the state of egypt. egypt is threatening israel. egypt is threatening the region because of the arab spring. we have to rethink the dollars that we are sending to egypt. we have to say that these dollars are for maintaining a security and peace and if you are not participating, you do not get these dollars. that is job one. we have to continue our commitment of foreign policy to israel. israel is our strongest ally and our sister country come and we need to do everything we can fulfill our to fulfill our commitment. all of the foreign aid is spent right here in america un-american jobs. that is when the requirements. we need to gather up our allies and protect the people who serve in our state department we can secure them, they shouldn't be there. >> moderator: i'm going to go forward, but what you think should be the basic guiding principles, speaking a bit more probably? berg: if you are referring to dollars spent, or in general, our foreign policy, americ
leadership's be it in egypt or turkey, and it's probably the move to undermind the palestinian authority because he's going to the united nations asking for the status of the states, observer state, but the change of subject, at least by the israelis away from iran and syria, on to gaza, to me, is a very fascinating development. is it temporary or going to be an ongoing -- how long is that change of subject? sometimes leaders and security people know better. they feel they could have contained escalation. maybe that's what they have in mind. is it doable? does it work in this part of the region we live in? the third promise president obama made, again, never made any commitments to syria on syria except on the chemical weapons. now, we understand right now that, you know, there's concern there was a suggestion of a need of 70 # ,000 troops in order to secure the chemical facilities in syria in case there's any suspicious movement, be it by, you know, helping, you know, by the jihadists taking over or the regime using these chemical weapons. i mean, this is a big promise as well. what pre
the networks in a very meaningful way. p.j. talked about what we found we look out egypt adhere to everything that was going on. people, you know, all over governments here were likely to we talk to? whose important? here's the scoop. right now industry there's nobody who can raise their hand and so i can identify who was the leader of egyptian revolution, because there wasn't one. it was coalition's ever-changing coalitions of interest moving. as you look at the social media map you see that there was no one leader. so we have got, we as a government and, frankly, governments everywhere have got to figure out to do that, how did he get into that marketplace of ideas. one of the things that we did, not surprising with my background, i was very focused on consumer research, understand what was going on. one of the things i found it in government, we spent a lot of time, hundreds of millions of dollars, looking at economic elites, political elites in others, looking through different lenses. if you just look at it that way, you don't look at it to a more classic consumer lens, then if you are a
. you take a look at egypt. under the original peace plan we gave tremendous amounts of foreign aid to egypt. you know what right now? egypt is threatening israel. egypt is threatening israel because of the arab spring. we have to rethink the dollars we're sending to egypt. we have to say these dollars are for maintaining a security and a peace. if you're not participating you don't get the dollars. that is job one. we need our commitment to foreign poll to israel. israel is our strongest ally. it is our sister country and we need to do everything we can to fulfill our commitment. which incidentally all the foreign aid we give israel, military aid is spent right here in america on american jobs. that is one of the requirements. but when you look broadly at the arab spring, there was a lot of hope this would continue deepak civil we're falling into what has become not secular governments but religious governments. we need to be gathering up all of our allies and we need to be making a firm statement that this region needs to be stablized and we need to protect people that serve in ou
, interconnected. hamas is testing israel. israel is testing egypt. there's more uncertainty than ever about syria, its relationship with iran, whether it can hold lebanon together, what is hezbollah doing now that its backers are in their own fights inside syria. the evolving role of qatar and saudi arabia, and turkey playing a role. it's enormous. of anything at the security conference, this is probably the least secure discussion there is. i'm reminded of bob dylan's favorite song, "along the watchtower," and that should be our anthem this morning. there must be a way out of here so let's aim for some relief and less confusion, and i want to propose the following format just for the beginning of this panel, and then i think i want to open it up to a lot of questions from the floor because i'm there are a lot of questions swimming in your head. i'd like to propose our panelists talk about the flow of the situation right now, especially in syria. the what if scenarios. we'll spend a little bit of time on, and then their recommendations and context and perspective on greater security in the region
Search Results 0 to 10 of about 11